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Abstract 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) removed the barriers that separated commercial 
banking from investment banking, merchant banking, and insurance activities.  Did this 
legislation revolutionize the financial services industry by allowing Financial Holding 
Companies (FHCs) to exploit revenue efficiencies and cost economies, or did it merely formalize 
an evolutionary process of deregulation that was already well underway?  Our evidence refutes 
the notion that the GLBA was a revolutionary event, at least in the short run.  Using a 
combination of accounting and market data, we find that, to date, FHC status has had little effect 
on bank performance.  We do find, however, limited evidence that FHCs that were Section 20 
affiliates before passage of the GLBA were able to further exploit the synergies between 
investment banking and commercial banking. 
JEL Codes:  G1, G2 
Key Words:  Financial holding companies, Bank holding companies, Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
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1.  Introduction 
  In late 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), which deregulated 
the financial services industry by expanding the powers of financial institutions in the United 
States.
1  As of March 12, 2000, the effective date of the legislation, the GLBA, also known as the 
Financial Services Modernization Act, allowed for the formation of financial holding companies 
(FHCs), which were permitted to engage in “any activity that is financial in nature.”  FHCs can 
now engage in activities including, but not limited to, loan making and deposit taking, insurance 
underwriting and other insurance activities, merchant banking, investment banking, brokerage 
services, and other securities activities.
2 
  The biggest potential benefit of the GLBA is that it allows financial institutions to exploit 
the revenue efficiencies and scale and scope economies that were unavailable before 
deregulation.  These so-called “universal banks” can capture revenue efficiencies, for example, 
by cross-selling business products such as commercial loans and securities underwriting, or they 
can cross-sell retail products such as certificates of deposit, brokerage services, and insurance 
protection.  Economies of scale might result from consolidating back-office functions such as 
information technology and managerial overhead.  Economies of scope could accrue because the 
universal bank can transfer the costly information obtained on a given loan customer to its 
                                                 
1 We thank Andy Meyer for his data assistance.  We also thank Tom King, Ken Spong and seminar participants at 
Saint Louis University, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and the Federal Reserve System Committee on 
Financial Structure and Regulation for their comments.  Any errors or omissions are solely the responsibility of the 
authors.  The views expressed here are those of the authors, not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis or the Federal Reserve System.  
2 In this analysis, investment banking includes all securities activities and brokerage services.  
  1brokerage department when underwriting securities for the same customer.  (Kanatas and Qi, 
2003)  By capturing these economies, financial institutions can pass the benefits on to consumers 
in the form of lower prices or improved services.  Upon signing the legislation, President Clinton 
declared that it would save consumers billions of dollars a year.
3  Of course, the realized 
magnitude of these benefits is an empirical issue. 
Other analysts argue that the GLBA will have only minor effects on the financial industry 
because revenue efficiencies and scale and scope economies across financial services are small.  
To the extent that these economies exist, banking organizations had already found ways to 
exploit them before March 2000.  The legislation simply made it easier for organizations to 
continue to engage in the activities they had already undertaken.  From this perspective, financial 
services modernization was a rubber stamp on an evolutionary process well underway. 
The GLBA has also been criticized for potentially harming consumers and taxpayers.  
Some worry that the legislation concentrates too much market power in just a few firms, leading 
to higher prices.
4  Others criticize the legislation for going too far in lifting the barriers between 
financial industries, exacerbating the risks to the deposit insurance fund (Heller, 2002).  Should 
an FHC non-bank subsidiary suffer significant losses, the holding company may drain equity 
from the commercial bank to offset the losses, threatening the solvency of the commercial bank 
and putting the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on the hook to cover losses to insured 
depositors.  Still others point to the inherent conflicts of interest that financial institutions face 
when providing certain combinations of financial services, arguing that tying arrangements and 
                                                 
3 Anason, Dean, “Clinton Enacts Glass-Steagall Repeal,” American Banker, November 15, 1999. 
4 See Anason, Dean, “Senate Passes Reform Bill; Gramm Calls for a Sequel,” American Banker, November 5, 1999.  
Senator Paul D. Wellstone argued that the GLBA could hurt consumers because the concentration of economic 
power would lead to higher fees and decreased lending in low-income areas. 
  2other anti-competitive practices now are easier to conduct.  Indeed, the role of large financial 
institutions in fueling the boom-and-bust Enron episode highlights the conflicts of interest that 
existed between traditional loan activity, investment banking, and equity analysis even before the 
passage of GLBA (Fortune, 2003).  Bankers at some of the largest U.S. financial institutions 
allegedly engaged in questionable financing arrangements with Enron in return for a promise to 
receive Enron’s investment banking business.  In addition, an equity analyst at one financial 
institution allegedly was fired for giving unfavorable equity ratings to Enron.  Three firms—
JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, and Merrill Lynch—recently paid a total of $366 million in fines for 
their roles in the Enron scandal. 
In this paper, we look for evidence that the GLBA led to a financial revolution—defined 
as significant gains in revenues, or large reductions in costs or risks—by comparing the 
performance of FHCs before (1996 to 2000) and after (2000 to 2003) passage of the GLBA.  
Previous studies of the GLBA have found significant risk and return effects, but these studies 
have relied exclusively on market returns from event studies surrounding passage of the 
legislation (Al Mamun, Hassan, Son Lai, 2004; Akhigbe, Whyte, 2004).
5  Event studies measure 
the ex-ante returns that rational investors expect the firm to accrue.  We are the first to track ex-
post changes in accounting income and balance sheet ratios.  If the short-run gains to profitability 
and risk are large, they should appear in the banks’ bottom line.  We supplement accounting data 
with stock market returns pre- and post-GLBA.  Evidence supported by equity returns, however, 
are suggestive at best because of the evidence that markets priced in equity gains before passage 
of the GLBA.  In addition, returns from event studies over such long windows are likely to be 
influenced by many factors besides passage of the GLBA. 
                                                 
5 Carow and Heron (2002) find that bank stock prices were not materially affected by the legislation.  
  3The weight of the evidence suggests that, to date, the GLBA has had little effect on bank 
revenues, costs, or risks.  Although FHCs have expanded somewhat into their newly permissible 
activities, most FHCs still derive their earnings from traditional banking activities.  Synergies 
between commercial banking, insurance activities, and merchant banking appear to be small.  
Although synergies between investment banking and commercial banking appear to be larger, 
many FHCs were already conducting considerable securities activities well before passage of the 
GLBA, authorized by so-called Section 20 exemptions.  It is too early to assess the long-term 
impacts of the financial modernization legislation; however, early indications suggest that the 
legislation will have modest effects on the financial services industry. 
2.  Financial Modernization in Historical Perspective 
To place the GLBA in historical context, it is helpful to examine the major legislative 
developments that influenced the evolution of the U.S. financial sector in the 20
th century.  The 
National Banking Act of 1864 permitted banks to engage only in activities that were “incidental” 
to the business of banking.  Insurance activities were excluded from the list of permissible 
activities.  Securities activities, however, were permissible as long as banks conducted these 
activities in affiliates (White, 1986).  Investment banking grew quickly in the 1920s, fueled by 
the explosion in bond underwriting to finance World War I and a booming economy and stock 
market in the 1920s. 
The stock market crash of 1929 ushered in the Great Depression.  Between 1929 and 
early 1933, over 5,000 banks—20 percent of the total—failed.  Because of the perception that 
banks’ involvement in securities activities facilitated the Depression, Congress passed the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933, which prohibited banks from issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing 
any type of securities with the exception of U.S. Government and Government Agency 
  4securities, and certain municipal bonds. 
Some banks sought to circumvent bank regulations by forming holding companies to 
which the bank would be sold.  The holding company might acquire nonbank subsidiaries such 
as investment banks and insurance firms and use bank resources to engage in these activities.  To 
close that loophole, Congress passed the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 which provided 
that nonbank companies owned by bank holding companies must be engaged in activities 
“closely related to banking.”  Such activities were to be decided and defined by the Federal 
Reserve System.  The Douglas Amendment to the Holding Company Act reinforced the 
geographic restrictions on banks (imposed by states and the McFadden Act) by prohibiting 
BHCs from controlling banks located outside of their home states unless states explicitly allowed 
out-of-state holding companies (Kane, 1996). 
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 also placed strict limits on merchant banking 
activities by establishing so-called “5 percent subs.”  BHCs could make passive equity 
investments in nonfinancial companies up to a limit of 5 percent of the voting shares and 25 
percent of the total equity of companies in which they invested.  In 1958, the Small Business 
Investment Act authorized BHCs to provide equity to small businesses through Small Business 
Investment Corporations (SBICs).  BHCs could invest up to 5 percent of their banks’ capital in 
SBICs (Craig, 2001). 
By the 1970s, Depression-era conditions had faded from the minds of the American 
public. Federal deposit insurance and government regulation had restored confidence in financial 
institutions and reduced the number of depository institution failures to a fraction of their former 
  5numbers.
6  In turn, the rationales for the geographic restrictions imposed on banks and for the 
compartmentalization of the financial sector were questioned.  A number of government-
mandated studies were released calling for deregulation and greater reliance on market forces.
7  
In addition, several studies argued that securities activities of commercial banks were not 
significant factors leading to the banking crises during the Great Depression (White, 1986; Ang 
and Richardson, 1993; Kroszner and Rajan, 1994 and 1997). 
Geographic restrictions on banks and BHCs were removed first.  These restrictions were 
relaxed state-by-state in the 1980s and early 1990s, culminating in the Riegle–Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.  This Act ushered in widespread interstate 
branch banking by permitting bank holdings companies to acquire banks in other states and, 
beginning in 1997, to consolidate bank charters. 
Like the geographic restrictions, Glass-Steagall provisions were lifted gradually.  Under 
Section 20 of the Act, banks were prohibited from affiliating with other financial institutions that 
were “engaged principally in the issue, floatation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution of 
financial assets.”  Over the years however, the term “engaged principally” became subject to re-
interpretation.  Through a series of court rulings and Federal Reserve Board interpretations, the 
type of securities and the proportion of assets that bank affiliates could devote to these securities 
were broadened.  By 1996, bank affiliates were allowed to underwrite up to 25 percent of 
revenue in corporate bond and equity issues.  Virtually all large bank holding companies had 
subsidiaries that were termed “Section 20 Securities Affiliates.”  By late 1999, with passage of 
                                                 
6 In 1934, the number of bank failures declined to 61. Beginning in 1943, and for the next three decades, the number 
of bank failures was less than ten per year. 
7 See, for example, Bentson (1972). 
  6the GLBA imminent, the number of Section 20 Banks stood at 45.  Table 1 lists these 
organizations. 
Given the gradual breakdown of Glass-Steagall and the merger-led growth of BHCs in 
the mid-1990s, the largest banking organizations pressed for Congressional action to repeal fully 
Glass-Steagall and other barriers in the hopes of further exploiting revenue efficiencies and 
economies of scale and scope.  Indeed, Citigroup received a temporary exemption in September 
1998 from the Federal Reserve to purchase Travelers Insurance, with the expectation that 
Congress would act before the exemption expired.  On November 12, 1999, laws separating 
commercial banking, investment banking, merchant banking, and insurance activities for U.S. 
institutions were effectively removed with the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  
Banking organizations are now allowed to form FHCs and engage in any activity that is financial 
in nature. 
To become an FHC, a banking organization must notify the Federal Reserve of its 
intention.  To be eligible, each depository institution controlled by the company must be well 
capitalized and well managed as of the date the company submits its declaration, and it must 
have a satisfactory Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) rating.  An election to become an FHC 
is effective on the 31st day after the date that the declaration was received unless the Board of 
Governors notifies the company prior to that time that the election is ineffective. 
3.  Comparison of FHCs and BHCs 
To gain an understanding of the similarities and differences between financial holding 
companies (FHCs) and bank holding companies that have not elected to become FHCs (BHCs), 
we compare various performance and condition measures.
8  Our dataset includes all top-tier 
                                                 
8 Although FHCs are technically also BHCs, we treat these groups as mutually exclusive. 
  7domestic banking organizations (whether they are FHCs or not) that file the Federal Reserve’s 
FR Y-9C—the Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies.  By including 
only top-tier organizations, we avoid double counting parent companies and their subsidiaries.  
Mandatory Y-9C reporters include all domestic BHCs and FHCs with total consolidated assets of 
at least $150 million.  Our sample consists of quarterly data between March 1996 and December 
2003.  This sample excludes several large foreign banking organizations that do not have 
domestically chartered BHCs, and it excludes most small domestic BHCs with consolidated 
assets less than $150 million.  The post-GLBA sample includes 29,043 quarterly observations, 
5,692 of which are for FHCs.  In addition to the FR Y-9C and its supplement, the FR Y-9CS, we 
utilize the Federal Reserve’s FR Y-12—the Consolidated Bank Holding Company Report of 
Equity Investments in Nonfinancial Companies—to obtain merchant banking information.  
Finally, we obtain monthly equity returns of publicly traded BHCs over the sample period from 
the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) data set. 
We begin by describing the growth in the number of FHCs since the passage of the 
GLBA.  As Figure 1 illustrates, the number of top-tier Y-9C filers increased rapidly from 94 in 
March 2000 to 442 in December 2003.  Since their formation, FHCs have accounted for a 
significant share of total banking assets because most large banking organizations elected to 
become FHCs shortly after passage of the GLBA.  In March 2000, FHCs accounted for 46 
percent of all domestic BHC assets; their share in December 2003 was 57 percent. 
Summary statistics show that FHCs are distinct from BHCs in several ways.  Of course, 
such comparisons are simply descriptive with no implications for causality because they do not 
control for the endogenous decision by an organization to become an FHC nor for the effects of 
other variables that effect performance such as size.  Table 2 lists equally-weighted quarterly 
  8balance sheet, income, and performance ratios for all FHCs and BHCs between January 2000 
and December 2003.  Not surprisingly, FHCs are much larger than BHCs.  FHCs have average 
total assets of nearly $16.9 billion while BHCs have average total assets of just over $1 billion.   
Balance sheet ratio differences between FHCs and BHCs are statistically significant but 
economically small.  FHCs have an average loan-to-asset ratio of 64.0 percent, just 1.2 
percentage points less than BHCs.  FHCs have slightly fewer securities and deposits, but 
relatively more trading assets and liabilities.
9  Equity at FHCs is 18 basis points higher than at 
BHCs. 
On average, FHCs are more profitable than BHCs, and they rely more heavily on 
noninterest revenue sources.  Quarterly annualized return on equity (ROE) is 12.55 percent at 
FHCs, 91 basis points higher than ROE at BHCs, and the difference is statistically significant at 
the one percent level.  FHCs earn 17 basis points less in net interest income than BHCs; 
however, they more than make up this difference through higher noninterest income.  
Specifically, FHCs earn an average 1.79 percent of assets in noninterest income, compared with 
noninterest income of 1.19 percent at BHCs.  This difference undoubtedly reflects the more 
diverse activities of FHCs as brokers and underwriters, compared with the more traditional 
lending activities of BHCs.  Noninterest expense, however, is also higher at FHCs by 36 basis 
points, which dampens profitability.  
Despite having greater net income than BHCs, FHCs do not appear to be more cost 
efficient.  The efficiency ratio is defined as noninterest expense divided by the sum of net 
interest income and noninterest income.  Intuitively, this ratio indicates the overhead expense 
                                                 
9 Trading assets and liabilities primarily are securities held for short-term gain or for market-making purposes. 
  9necessary to generate $1 in operating income.
10  Lower efficiency ratios, therefore, indicate 
better performance.  The average efficiency ratio at FHCs is 64.6 percent, nearly identical to the 
BHC efficiency ratio. 
Two measures of credit quality show little difference between FHCs and BHCs.  Net 
chargeoffs (total chargeoffs less recoveries) to total loans are nearly identical, and 
nonperforming loans (loans 90 days or more past due or non-accruing) to total loans at FHCs are 
just 5 basis points lower than the same ratio for BHCs. 
Stock market data fail to reveal statistically significant differences between FHCs and 
BHCs.  To calculate returns, we obtained the 36 monthly stock returns between January 2000 
and December 2002 for each publicly traded organization in our sample.  Firms were classified 
as either FHC or BHC depending on their status as of December 2002; organizations without all 
36 observations were excluded.  We calculated the three-year holding-period geometric return, 
including dividends.  FHCs earned a three-year average annual return of 15.4 percent compared 
with a 17.1 percent return for BHCs.  The difference, however, is statistically insignificant. 
Of course, one explanation for the similar stock returns is that the gradual deregulation of 
financial services before passage of the GLBA allowed many banks that eventually became 
FHCs to exploit the synergies.  Indeed, Carow and Heron (2002) find that the stock prices of 
both small and large banks were unaffected by the legislation because the major benefits to 
banks from product-line diversification were already impounded into bank stock prices before 
passage of the legislation.  Other researchers have found evidence that bank stocks benefited 
from pre-GLBA securities events.  Cyree (2000) studied the market reaction to the 1996 Federal 
Reserve Board announcement that increased the permissible revenue limit that BHCs could earn 
                                                 
10 Operating income measures earnings from core activities.  It excludes securities gains, extraordinary gains, and 
income taxes. 
  10from previously ineligible securities activities to 25 percent.  He found that banks, especially 
large banks and Section 20 banks, had positive and significant abnormal returns following this 
announcement.  Bhargava and Fraser (1998) studied the market response to four Federal Reserve 
Board decisions to allow bank holding companies to engage in investment banking through 
Section 20 subsidiaries.  They found positive abnormal returns for commercial banks from the 
initial powers granted by the Federal Reserve, but subsequent expansions of these powers 
produced negative abnormal returns.  Comparison of post-GLBA stock market returns, therefore, 
may be misleading because they fail to incorporate the gradual process of deregulation before 
implementation of the GLBA. 
In addition to comparing returns directly, we utilize equity returns to estimate firm betas.  
Lower betas imply lower systematic risk, all else equal.  FHC activities may help to reduce 
overall firm risk by allowing firms to diversify to an extent not allowed beforehand.  Conversely, 
FHCs are able to enter into riskier business lines such as investment and merchant banking, 
which may increase overall risk.  FHC betas, then, may be higher or lower than BHC betas.  To 
calculate betas, we regress, by firm, monthly equity returns (relative to the risk-free rate) on the 
S&P market index over the January 2000 to December 2002 time frame.  We then average the 
FHC betas and the BHC betas, respectively.  The results appear in Table 2.  On average, FHC 
betas are slightly higher than BHC betas; FHC betas average 0.31 while BHC betas average 
0.27.
11  The difference, however, is statistically insignificant.  In sum, the stock market evidence 
suggests either that the market already factored in the gains to firms becoming FHCs before 
implementation of the GLBA, or the market did not expect FHC status to boost firm profits or 
reduce risk significantly. 
  11One indication of the weak response of the banking industry to the GLBA is that, to date, 
FHCs are involved only modestly in their new universal banking powers to conduct investment 
banking, insurance underwriting, and merchant banking.  On average, FHCs are more heavily 
involved in investment banking than in insurance and merchant banking.  On an equally-
weighted basis, as Table 2 illustrates, the percentage of assets in securities subsidiaries was 0.95 
between 2000 and 2003; the percentages of assets in insurance and merchant banking 
subsidiaries were just 0.24 and 0.10, respectively.  In addition, income from these expanded 
activities is modest.  FHCs earned 0.28 percent of assets in investment banking activities, but just 
0.10 percent of assets from insurance activities, and 0.04 percent of assets from equity 
investments. 
A possible explanation for the similar condition and performance of FHCs and BHCs is 
that the cost of becoming an FHC is extremely low.  The process does invite additional 
regulatory scrutiny because each depository institution in the organization has to be consistently 
well managed and capitalized.  However, banks on average have been in remarkably good shape 
since 1993.  Many organizations that became FHCs may have had no intention of becoming 
universal banks in the short run.  Indeed, of the 524 distinct FHCs in our sample, 151 (28.8%) of 
them derived no income from, nor held any assets in, insurance underwriting, merchant banking, 
and investment banking activities. 
Because only a handful of the largest FHCs are involved significantly in investment 
banking, insurance underwriting, and merchant banking activities, it makes sense to examine 
these activities on an asset-weighted basis.  On this basis, FHC involvement in new activities is 
more significant.  Figure 2 plots FHC investment banking subsidiaries, insurance underwriting 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Although these market betas seem low, they are similar to estimates from other sources.  For example, Fidelity 
Investments (Fidelity.com) reports a beta of 0.6 for Bank of America and 0.2 for Wells Fargo between 2002 and 
  12subsidiaries, and merchant banking investments as a percent of total assets.   Investment banking 
subsidiaries—those that underwrite or deal in securities—are the largest cohort, accounting for 
between 9 and 14 percent of assets over the 2000 to 2003 time period.  As of December 2003, 
FHC assets in investment banking subsidiaries totaled $626 billion.  Three organizations—
Citigroup, Bank of America, and JPMorgan Chase—account for 73 percent of those assets, and 
another six organizations account for an additional 22 percent of assets.  Forty-seven FHCs in 
total report at least some involvement in investment banking. 
Insurance underwriting subsidiaries make up the next largest category of FHC-expanded 
activities.  These subsidiaries account for an average of more than 4 percent of assets, although 
the insurance activity increased significantly in the first quarter of 2002 when MetLife became 
an FHC.  Concentration in this industry is even higher than in the investment banking industry.  
As of December 2003, just two firms—MetLife and Citigroup—account for 97 percent of the 
$408 billion in insurance assets.  In all, 25 FHCs are engaged in at least some insurance 
underwriting. 
Merchant banking is the newly expanded activity that FHCs have utilized the least.  
Indeed, as Figure 2 illustrates, merchant banking investments as a percent of total FHC assets are 
tiny, never exceeding 0.3 percent.  As of year-end 2003, merchant banking investments across 
FHCs summed to just $10.5 billion.  Five organizations account for 80 percent of these assets.  
Fifteen FHCs in total are engaged in merchant banking activity. 
FHC revenues from insurance activities, investment banking, and merchant banking have 
been modest.  Figure 3 depicts asset-weighted revenues of BHCs and FHCs by source in 2003.  
As we would expect, BHCs earned very little revenue (25 basis points as a percent of assets) 
from these three activities.  FHCs, on the other hand, earned 111 basis points in revenue, 
                                                                                                                                                             
2005. 
  13primarily from investment banking (60 basis points) and from insurance activities (51 basis 
points).  The last column in Figure 3, however, puts this investment banking and insurance 
revenue into context.  In 2003 FHCs earned total revenues equal to 7.20 percent of assets.  
Revenues from FHCs’ newly permitted activities, therefore, constitute only 15.4 percent (1.11 / 
7.20) of total FHC revenues. 
In sum, FHCs to date are not that different from more traditional banking organizations.  
FHCs are larger and slightly more profitable than BHCs, and they earn a higher portion of 
revenues from noninterest income sources.  Their balance sheets, however, are quite similar to 
BHC balance sheets, along with credit quality, efficiency ratios, and stock market returns.  
Finally, the reach of FHCs into investment banking, insurance underwriting, and merchant 
banking is limited.  Only a handful of the largest FHCs have engaged significantly in these new 
activities. 
4.  FHC Performance Before and After Financial Modernization 
A key rationale for the GLBA was to give financial institutions the ability to capture 
additional revenue and cost economies.  In this section, we look for evidence that FHCs have 
been able to achieve these economies by comparing accounting ratios before and after passage of 
the GLBA.
12  Specifically, we select only those banking organizations that became FHCs by the 
end of 2003 and existed in each quarter between 1996 and 2003.  We run fixed-effect panel 
regressions of the following form: 
                                                 
12 In theory, a two-stage least squares procedure could be used to examine the effects of FHC status in the post-
GLBA era.  To do so requires instrumental variables that influence the decision to become an FHC but are 
uncorrelated with bank performance.  Such instruments are not available.  Instead, we explore the effect of FHC 
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η γ β α    (1) 
where BP is the bank performance variable; FHC is the indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
is an FHC and zero otherwise; LogTA is the log of total assets; and Date is a vector of quarterly 
time dummies that controls for business cycle influences.
13  The bank-level coefficients, αi, 
control for firm-specific time-invariant factors such as location and managerial talent that 
influence bank performance both before and after passage of the GLBA.  The FHC coefficient is 
the one of primary interest.  A statistically significant coefficient would suggest that FHC status 
has a discernable effect on FHCs’ condition or performance. 
Regression results in Panel A of Table 3 show that FHC status has little effect on holding 
company performance.  The FHC coefficients for three of the six balance sheet dependent 
variables—securities, trading assets, and equity—are statistically significant at the five and ten 
percent levels, respectively, but the economic significance of the coefficients is small.  The 52 
basis-point increase in the ratio of securities to assets at FHCs is just 2.3 percent of the average 
amount of securities held by FHCs.  In addition, the 17 basis-point increase in equity to assets at 
FHCs represents just 1.8 percent of the average equity to asset ratio.  The FHC coefficients for 
the income variables are statistically insignificant, although they move in expected directions.  
Interest income declines by 4 basis points at FHCs while noninterest income increases 9 basis 
points.  ROA and ROE decline by 2 basis points and 34 basis points, respectively.  Other 
performance indicators tell a similar story.  Although statistically insignificant, the efficiency 
ratio is 18 basis points higher for FHCs, suggesting that cost economies are small.  Credit risk 
measures—chargeoffs and nonperforming loans—are essentially unchanged at FHCs.  These 
                                                 
13 The first time dummy is excluded to avoid multicollinearity with the firm-level intercepts. 
  15results suggest that banking organizations that ultimately became FHCs in the post-GLBA era 
showed little change in performance or risk relative to their pre-FHC performance. 
We would expect that banking organizations are responding to the GLBA provisions 
gradually over time.  Equation (1), however, does not control for the length of time a firm is an 
FHC.  To do so, we replace the FHC variable with FHCAGE, where FHCAGE is the number of 
quarters that the firm has been an FHC.
14  Results are reported in Panel B of Table 3. 
As expected, the balance-sheet coefficients on FHCAGE are more statistically and 
economically significant than the coefficients on the FHC indicator variable.  For example, the 
ratio of loans to assets drops by 28 basis points for each quarter that a firm is an FHC.  The 
average firm that is an FHC for the entire 16 quarters in the post-GLBA sample would 
experience a drop in the loan-to-asset ratio of 4.5 percentage points.  In addition, a four-year 
FHC would experience an increase in security-to-asset ratio of 2.7 percentage points, and the 
equity-to-asset ratio would rise by 48 basis points.   
The regressions with dependent income variables show that the length of time a firm was 
an FHC had little effect on earnings.  Interest expense falls by 1 basis-point, noninterest expense 
increases by 2 basis-points, provision expense increases by 1 basis-point, and return on equity 
decreases by 10 basis points for each quarter a firm is an FHC.  Because earnings changed little 
after a firm became an FHC, the lower ROE must be driven by the higher capital held at FHCs.  
Finally, efficiency ratios and nonperforming loans to total loans increase 14 basis points and 3 
basis-points, respectively, each quarter a banking organization is an FHC.  Again, the evidence 
refutes the notion that FHCs are more cost-efficient than they were before becoming FHCs. 
                                                 
14 We also experimented with the squared value of FHCAGE—in place of and in addition to the FHC variable—to 
control for the possibility that the age effects are nonlinear.  The results were not sensitive to the specification used. 
  16Stock market returns, reported in Table 4, show that FHC returns declined in the post-
GLBA era, even when compared with peer returns.  Between 1996 and 1998, three-year average 
annual equity returns at firms that eventually became FHCs registered 28.4 percent, exceeding 
equity returns at other BHCs by 3.3 percentage points.  From 2000 to 2002, however, three-year 
returns at FHCs fell to 15.4 percent, 1.7 percentage points lower than returns at BHCs.  The 
inter-period change in average annual returns relative to BHCs, then, is -5.0 (-1.7 – 3.3) 
percentage points, a statistically significant decline. 
A decline in systemic risk at FHCs cannot account for the lower FHC returns because 
relative FHC betas did not change significantly after passage of the GLBA.
15  As Table 4 shows, 
the average beta at future FHCs was 0.85 between 1996 and 1998, 0.23 higher than the beta at 
BHCs that did not become FHCs.  In the 2000 to 2002 period, FHC betas were 0.31, 0.05 higher 
than BHC betas.  The inter-period difference relative to BHCs of -0.18 is statistically 
insignificant.  Again, the lower post-GLBA returns are consistent with two stories.  Either FHCs 
experienced abnormal positive returns in the pre-GLBA era, or market participants did not 
anticipate stronger earnings potential at FHCs relative to BHCs. 
In sum, banking organizations that ultimately became FHCs in the post-GLBA era 
showed little change in condition and performance relative to the pre-GLBA era.  Balance sheet 
and income measures changed little, equity returns declined, and changes in betas did not reflect 
significant changes in firm risk.  These results, combined with the low levels of insurance and 
merchant banking activities in FHCs described in the previous section, suggest that either the 
                                                 
15 Akhigbe and Whyte (2004) find that all banking organizations experienced an increase in idiosyncratic risk as 
measured by an increase in the variance of stock returns following passage of the GLBA.  However, they fail to find 
evidence that FHCs increased risk by more than BHCs.  
  17synergies between commercial banking, insurance underwriting, and merchant banking are 
modest, or these synergies take longer than four years to materialize.  The synergy between 
commercial banking and investment banking requires additional analysis for reasons we describe 
below.  
5.  Performance Analysis of Section 20 vs. Non-Section 20 FHCs 
In this section, we examine separately the effects of the GLBA on Section 20 FHCs and 
non-Section 20 FHCs to isolate better the synergies between commercial banking and investment 
banking.  We define Section 20 FHCs as those organizations that had Section 20 powers prior to 
passage of the GLBA and subsequently chose to become FHCs.  Non-Section 20 FHCs are 
organizations that became FHCs but did not have Section 20 exemptions before passage of the 
GLBA. 
There are three possible explanations for the regression results above that examined 
FHCs as a single cohort and found few synergies between commercial banking and investment 
banking.  First, synergies between investment banking and commercial banking may be small.  A 
second possibility is that Section 20 FHCs may have already exhausted the synergies before 
passage of the GLBA by utilizing their investment banking powers granted by the Federal 
Reserve beginning in 1986.  These explanations suggest either that the GLBA was unimportant 
or it formalized a process already well underway.  However, a third possibility is that the non-
Section 20 FHCs in the regressions may have masked more significant changes within the 
Section 20 FHCs because just 20 of the 198 banking organizations in the sample were Section 20 
  18organizations.
16  It could be the case that only those firms with previous securities activities 
(through Section 20 exemptions) were in a position to take immediate advantage of the new 
universal banking powers.  If so, a separate analysis of the effect of the GLBA on Section 20 
banks should reflect better the synergies between investment banking and commercial banking.  
There is some evidence that banking organizations responded favorably to Section 20 
exemptions before passage of the GLBA.  Cornett, Ors, and Tehranian (2002) found that Section 
20 status boosted the performance of BHCs between April 1987 and December 1997.  The 
authors found that in the three years after the establishment of a Section 20 subsidiary, pretax 
cash flow performance increased significantly relative to non-Section 20 banks and investment 
banks.  They concluded that the changes in regulation allowing commercial banks to diversify 
their activities into investment banking have resulted in increased performance relative to the 
risk being undertaken.  We explore whether any performance advantage materialized after 
passage of the GLBA. 
Summary statistics shown in Table 5 reveal significant differences between Section 20 
and non-Section 20 banks in the post-GLBA era.  The table contains equally-weighted quarterly 
income and balance sheet ratios for the years 2000 through 2003 for each group of banks.  
Section 20 FHCs enjoy a tremendous size advantage; they have, on average, $177.7 billion more 
in assets than their counterparts.  In addition, they hold fewer loans, deposits, and equity.  Net 
interest income is 89 basis points lower, and noninterest income is 1.20 percentage points higher 
than the same ratio at non-Section 20 banks.  In addition, efficiency ratios are higher and loan 
                                                 
16 Out of 45 firms that had Section 20 exemptions as of December 31, 1999, 20 are included in our regression 
sample, 15 are foreign banking organizations without a domestic holding company, 3 merged out of existence, 2 
never became FHCs, and 5 did not exist in each quarter between 1996 and 2003. 
  19quality is lower at Section 20 FHCs.  The average annual stock market return between 2000 and 
2002 was just 3.1 percent for Section 20 FHCs, compared with a 17.2 percent return for non-
Section 20 FHCs.  This result is consistent with Carow and Heron (2002) who fail to find 
significant abnormal returns from Section 20 banks upon passage of the GLBA.  They conclude 
that firms with Section 20 subsidiaries prior to the GLBA will not retain important first-mover 
advantages in the post-GLBA era.  
Summary statistics do not control for the influence that pre-GLBA Section 20 status had 
on the condition and performance of FHCs.  To control for this effect, we run the following 
fixed-effects panel regression on quarterly data between 1996 and 2003: 
     (2)  it
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where the familiar variables are the same as described above and FHC x S20 is an interactive 
term that is equal to a value of one if the firm is an FHC in a given quarter and was a Section 20 
bank in December 1999, and zero otherwise.
17  The bank sample includes the same 198 banking 
organizations from the equation (1) regression.  The interactive term is the variable of interest.   
Statistically and economically significant coefficients would suggest that FHCs that were 
previously Section 20 banks responded differently to the GLBA than FHCs that were not 
previously Section 20 banks.  Regression results are in Table 6. 
The results in Table 6 provide some indication that Section 20 FHCs reacted differently 
to the GLBA than other FHCs, but there is no evidence to support profit or cost advantages.  
Section 20 FHCs sharply reduced their loan holdings by 6.9 percentage points and they increased 
securities holdings by 3.1 percentage points.  In addition, the ratio of equity to assets increased 
                                                 
17 A section 20 indicator variable is not included in equation (2) because the effects of that variable are captured   
completely by the fixed-effects intercepts. 
  20by 42 basis points.  All of these changes are statistically significant at the one percent level.  
Interest income decreased by a statistically significant 51 basis points, although noninterest 
income increased by just 16 basis points, a statistically insignificant change.  ROA was 6 basis 
points lower for Section 20 FHCs, also a statistically insignificant change.  ROE at Section 20 
FHCs, however, was 1.90 percentage points lower than other FHCs.  Finally, the efficiency ratio 
at Section 20 FHCs was a statistically insignificant 52 basis points lower than the ratio at non-
Section 20 FHCs, suggesting that the Section 20 FHCs did not experience significant cost 
advantages relative to other FHCs following passage of the GLBA. 
In sum, our analysis suggests that the effects of the GLBA on Section 20 FHCs were 
modest, but certainly larger than the effects on non-Section 20 FHCs.  Although Section 20 
FHCs do not appear to be more profitable or cost effective than other FHCs, they do appear to be 
repositioning themselves to exploit presumed synergies between investment banking and 
commercial banking.  Some anecdotal evidence indicates that these synergies are developing.  A 
recent New York Times article documented the relative decline of two stand-alone investment 
banks—Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley—relative to the investment banks that are part of 
banking organizations such as Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase.
18  Interestingly, Kanatas and Qi 
(2003) assert that the economies of scope that promote the universal banking structure will 
simultaneously reduce investment-banking innovation.  They argue that a failed securities 
offering by a universal bank will not harm the bank as much as it would harm a specialized 
investment banker because the universal bank’s knowledge of the customer allows it to make the 
                                                 
18 Thomas, Landon, “The Incredible Shrinking Investment Bank,” New York Times, October 17, 2004.  The 
animation studio DreamWorks proved a specific example of how JPMorgan Chase was able to use its bank 
relationship with the firm to win the investment banking business.  
  21customer a loan with competitive terms.  In contrast, a specialized investment bank has more to 
lose if the security offering fails.  Whether the GLBA affects innovation in the long run is not 
clear.  What is clear is that the GLBA to date has not caused a financial revolution; rather, it has 
contributed to the deregulation of financial markets and institutions within the U.S. with 
remarkably little impact. 
6.  Conclusion 
One justification for the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 was to provide new 
opportunities to financial institutions to exploit revenue efficiencies and economies of scale and 
scope by becoming universal banks.  We fail to find evidence, however, that FHCs were able to 
capture significant and immediate benefits from this legislation.  A comparison of FHCs and 
BHCs between 2000 and 2003 reveals few differences in key performance ratios.  Moreover, 
FHCs do not seem to have improved performance significantly in the post-GLBA era relative to 
the pre-GLBA era.  This evidence supports the view that although the GLBA was a further step 
in the evolutionary process of financial deregulation, it did not revolutionize the financial 
services industry.  Indeed, our results are consistent with that of Santomero (2001), who argues 
that financial modernization is not a single event or law, but rather a relentless process of eroding 
the constraints placed on the financial marketplace during the Great Depression. 
One partial explanation for banks’ reluctance to enter the insurance, investment banking, 
and merchant banking arenas could be the unfortunate series of three events following passage of 
the GLBA.  First, the NASDAQ index dropped precipitously beginning in the Spring of 2000.  
Second, the economy slipped into recession in March of 2001.  Finally, the terrorist attacks on 
the World Trade Center occurred on September 11, 2001.  Each of these events could have 
negatively affected banks’ appetite for engaging in new activities.  Although it is impossible to 
  22conduct a counterfactual analysis in an environment without these events, we believe that if 
synergies were strong enough, FHCs would have acted to exploit them despite these negative 
shocks. 
A key implication of this study is that consumers are not likely to benefit significantly in 
the short term from lower prices or improved services offered by FHCs because revenue and cost 
efficiencies appear to be small.  The financial services industry is slowly evolving and adjusting 
to the new legislation; therefore, products and prices are likely to change slowly as well. 
This study, like many others that study cost economies and revenue efficiencies in 
financial services, continues to pose the paradox that banking organizations are growing and 
financial deregulation is occurring despite the inability of researchers to identify clear benefits.  
A key task for future research is either to identify the benefits or to understand better why the 
demand for expansion and deregulation in financial services is so strong if the gains to banking 
organizations are modest.  
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DRESDNER BANK AG UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORPORATION
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND
FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION WACHOVIA CORPORATION
FIRST UNION CORPORATION WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
FLEETBOSTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION
Source:  Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Table 1
Section 20 Banking Organizations as of December 31, 1999
26Size N Mean N Mean
Total assets (000s) 5692 16,854,370 23,351  1,044,447 15,809,924 ***
Balance Sheet (percent of total assets)
Loans 5691 63.95 23,351  65.18 -1.23 ***
Securities 5691 22.20 23,351  23.20 -1.00 ***
Trading assets 5634 0.57 22,771  0.03 0.54 ***
Deposits 5692 76.39 23,351  80.97 -4.57 ***
Trading liabilities 5632 0.24 22,716  0.00 0.24 ***
Equity 5692 9.30 23,351  9.12 0.18 **
Income (percent of average assets)
Interest income  5611 6.25 22,910  6.61 -0.36 ***
Interest expense  5611 2.53 22,910  2.72 -0.19 ***
Net interest income  5611 3.72 22,910  3.89 -0.17 ***
Noninterest income  5611 1.79 6,140     1.19 0.60 ***
Noninterest expense  5611 3.62 22,910  3.27 0.36 ***
Provision expense  5602 0.30 22,838  0.34 -0.04 ***
Net income (ROA) 5611 1.17 22,910  1.09 0.08 ***
Return on equity (ROE) 5611 12.55 22,910  11.64 0.91 ***
FHC Expanded Activities (percent of assets)
Securities subsidiary assets  5509 0.95 10,942  0.00 0.95 ***
Insurance subsidiary assets  5504 0.24 10,948  0.00 0.24 ***
Investments held under merchant banking authority  2439 0.10 51          0.00 0.10 ***
Property & casualty underwriting assets  3349 0.06 11,679  0.00 0.06 ***
Life and health underwriting assets  3340 0.28 11,676  0.00 0.28 ***
Inv banking, advisory, brokerage, underwriting fees &commissions  4727 0.28 16,980  0.03 0.25 ***
Underwriting income from insurance and reinsurance activities  1726 0.03 16,666  0.00 0.03 ***
Income from other insurance and reinsurance activities  1732 0.07 6,115     0.04 0.04 ***
Impact on net income from all equity investments 198 0.04 80          -0.02 0.06
Performance (percent)
Average annual stock market return (2000-2002) 92 15.4 165        17.1 -1.7
Stock market betas (2000-2002) 110 0.31 272        0.27 0.04
Efficiency ratio 5601 43.6 22,910  41.7 1.91 ***
Net chargeoffs to total loans  5593 0.34 22,856  0.35 -0.01
Nonperforming loans to total loans 5688 0.90 23,331  0.95 -0.05 ***
*, **, ***  statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Difference
Table 2






Balance Sheet (percent of total assets) FHC T-value Pr > |t| N R
2 FHCAGE T-value Pr > |t| N R
2
Loans -0.17 -0.61 0.543 6335 0.05 -0.28 *** -6.81 0.000 6335 0.06
Securities 0.52 ** 1.98 0.05 6328 0.10 0.17 *** 4.48 0.000 6328 0.11
Trading assets 0.09 * 1.88 0.060 6276 0.01 0.05 *** 6.26 0.000 6276 0.02
Deposits -0.34 -1.61 0.108 6335 0.26 0.08 *** 2.72 0.007 6335 0.26
Trading liabilities -0.01 -0.39 0.693 6272 0.01 0.02 *** 4.43 0.000 6272 0.01
Equity 0.17 * 1.88 0.060 6335 0.11 0.03 ** 2.37 0.018 6335 0.11
Income (percent of average assets)
Interest income  -0.04 -0.91 0.363 6328 0.65 0.00 -0.37 0.708 6328 0.65
Interest expense  -0.01 -0.67 0.500 6328 0.82 -0.01 ** -2.05 0.041 6328 0.82
Net interest income  -0.02 -0.83 0.409 6328 0.18 0.00 1.12 0.262 6328 0.18
Noninterest income  0.09 1.21 0.225 6328 0.03 0.01 0.94 0.346 6328 0.03
Noninterest expense  0.08 1.16 0.247 6328 0.01 0.02 * 1.8 0.072 6328 0.01
Provision expense  0.01 0.47 0.638 6326 0.05 0.01 *** 3.47 0.001 6326 0.05
Net income (ROA) -0.02 -0.47 0.640 6328 0.03 -0.01 -1.23 0.220 6328 0.03
Return on equity -0.34 -1.13 0.261 6335 0.02 -0.10 ** -2.16 0.031 6335 0.02
Performance (percent)
Efficiency ratio 0.18 0.43 0.671 6335 0.04 0.14 ** 2.27 0.023 6335 0.04
Net chargeoffs to total loans -0.01 -0.23 0.818 6324 0.05 0.01 1.57 0.116 6324 0.05
Nonperforming loans to total loans 0.04 1.52 0.130 6335 0.04 0.03 *** 6.22 0.000 6335 0.05
*, **, ***  statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table 3
Number of quarters bank is FHC FHC Status
Fixed-Effect Regression Results of FHC Status on Bank Performance
Panel A Panel B
28Average Annual Stock Market Returns (percent) FHC BHC Difference
Pre-GLBA (1996-19999) 28.4 25.1 3.3
Post-GLBA (2000-2003) 15.4 17.1 -1.7
     Difference (post-GLBA less pre-GLBA) -5.0 **
Stock Market Betas (average) FHC BHC Difference
Pre-GLBA (1996-19999) 0.85 0.62 0.23
Post-GLBA (2000-2003) 0.31 0.27 0.05
     Difference (post-GLBA less pre-GLBA) -0.18
*, **, ***  statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table 4
Equity Performance Indicators
29Size N Mean N Mean
Total assets (000s) 456 177,377,206 6,656  3,071,012 174,306,194 ***
Balance Sheet (percent of total assets)
Loans 456 52.8 6,655  65.2 -12.37 ***
Securities 456 18.5 6,655  22.6 -4.07 ***
Trading assets 456 5.5 6,554  0.1 5.37 ***
Deposits 456 57.7 6,656  78.2 -20.52 ***
Trading liabilities 456 2.8 6,552  0.0 2.82 ***
Equity 456 8.1 6,656  9.3 -1.18 ***
Income (percent of average assets)
Interest income  454 5.44 6,558  6.49 -1.05 ***
Interest expense  454 2.55 6,558  2.70 -0.15 **
Net interest income  454 2.89 6,558  3.79 -0.90 ***
Noninterest income  454 2.87 6,558  1.61 1.26 ***
Noninterest expense  454 3.75 6,558  3.55 0.19 **
Provision expense  454 0.42 6,545  0.28 0.14 ***
Net income (ROA) 454 1.07 6,558  1.15 -0.09 **
Return on equity 454 12.4 6,558  12.5 -0.07
FHC Securities Activities (percent of assets)
Securities subsidiary assets  436 7.43 5,370  0.38 7.06 ***
Inv banking, advisory, brokerage, underwriting fees & commissions  332 0.70 5,018  0.23 0.47 ***
Performance (percent)
Market return (2000-2002) 13 3.10 79        17.20 -14.10
Efficiency ratio 444 45.20 6,558  42.67 2.53 ***
Net chargeoffs to total loans 454 0.70 6,533  0.30 0.40 ***
Nonperforming loans to total loans 456 1.26 6,652  0.86 0.40 ***
*, **, ***  statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Difference
Table 5







30Balance Sheet (percent of total assets) FHC Age Pr > |t| FHC * S20 Pr > |t| N R
2
Loans -0.11 *** 0.008 -6.85 *** 0.000 6335 0.10
Securities 0.09 ** 0.017 3.11 *** 0.000 6328 0.12
Trading assets 0.01 0.282 1.47 *** 0.000 6276 0.09
Deposits 0.07 ** 0.031 0.62 ** 0.040 6335 0.26
Trading liabilities 0.00 0.208 0.47 *** 0.000 6272 0.04
Equity 0.02 0.125 0.42 *** 0.001 6335 0.11
Income (percent of average assets)
Interest income  0.01 * 0.083 -0.51 *** 0.000 6328 0.66
Interest expense  0.00 0.834 -0.29 *** 0.000 6328 0.82
Net interest income  0.01 ** 0.014 -0.22 *** 0.000 6328 0.18
Noninterest income  0.01 0.567 0.16 0.149 6328 0.03
Noninterest expense  0.02 * 0.056 -0.07 0.490 6328 0.01
Provision expense  0.01 *** 0.009 0.07 *** 0.002 6326 0.05
Net income (ROA) -0.01 0.333 -0.06 0.353 6328 0.03
Return on equity -0.05 0.297 -1.90 *** 0.000 6335 0.03
Performance (percent)
Efficiency ratio 0.16 ** 0.016 -0.52 0.393 6335 0.04
Net chargeoffs to total loans 0.00 0.699 0.17 *** 0.000 6324 0.06
Nonperforming loans to total loans 0.02 *** 0.000 0.23 *** 0.000 6335 0.06
*, **, ***  statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Table 6
Regression Results of FHC Effect on Section 20 Banking Organizations
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Asset-Weighted Revenue by Organization and Activity
in 2003 (percent of assets)
BHC FHC FHC Total Income
Insurance
Inv. Banking
Noninterest 
revenue
3.09%
Interest 
revenue
4.12%
0.25%
1.11%
7.20%
Inv. Banking 0.05%
Insurance 0.07%
Merchant Banking 0.13%